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Abstract
We estimate potential welfare gains from ﬁnancial integration and corresponding
better insurance against country-speciﬁc shocks to output (risk sharing) for the
twenty-ﬁve European Union countries. Using theoretical utility-based measures
we express the gains from risk sharing as the utility equivalent of a permanent
increase in consumption. We report positive potential welfare gains for all the
EU countries if they move toward full risk sharing. Ten country-members who
joined the Union in 2004 have more volatile or counter-cyclical consumption and
output and would obtain much higher potential gains than the longer-standing
ﬁfteen members.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F15, F36, E32
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On May 1, 2004, ten central and eastern European countries became members of the Eu-
ropean Union (the EU).1 In addition to political uniﬁcation, the EU member-countries
are moving toward a larger uniﬁed market with a joint economic policy and possibly a
single currency, the euro. There are indisputable large gains from joining the EU. We
estimate potential gains from ﬁnancial integration for the twenty-ﬁve current European
Union member-countries. Our criterion of integration is the degree of insurance against
the country-speciﬁc output shocks (consumption risk sharing).2 Our empirical results show
that if these countries move towards full ﬁnancial integration, all the members would gain
from risk sharing. Ten new members would have much higher potential gains compared
to the original EU-15 countries; still, the EU enlargement would not reduce the welfare of
EU-15 members.
Conventional wisdom holds that trade integration is one of the most beneﬁcial aspects
of economic integration (Sachs and Warner 1995; Frankel and Romer 1999; Rodriguez and
Rodrik 2002). The merits of ﬁnancial integration are more disputed because of the recent
ﬁnancial crises and instability they brought to a number of the emerging markets that
opened up to foreign capital ﬂows.3 The beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration can work through
several channels. Directly, countries can ﬁnance domestic investment beyond domestic sav-
ing constraints, obtain capital at lower cost because of a more eﬃcient allocation of world
savings (Henry 2003; Stulz 1999), access new technology (Grossman and Helpman 1991),
and smooth ﬂuctuations in income and consumption by diversifying away country-speciﬁc
1The pre-2004 EU included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; we call them “EU-15
Members ” throughout the paper. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia joined the EU in May 2004. We call them “New Members.”
2A number of papers starting from van Wincoop (1994) demonstrate that theoretical welfare gains from
risk sharing might be quite substantial (Prasad et al. 2003 summarize the utility gain estimates in the
literature). We follow the literature and use the term “welfare gains” to represent the gains in utility (in
percent) to a representative consumer (or, by extension, a country) from a permanent increase in consumption
which are equal to the potential expected utility gains when an economy moves to the prefect risk sharing
consumption allocation.
3See Rodrik (1998); Bhagwati (1998); Stiglitz (2002). Prasad et al. (2003) survey the empirical evidence
on the matter and show that developing countries have not fully attained potential beneﬁts of ﬁnancial
integration and were subject to higher vulnerability to crises.
1output risks (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996). Indirectly, ﬁnancial openness can stimulate do-
mestic ﬁnancial development (Levine 2005; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2005), impose
discipline on macroeconomic policies, and improve domestic institutions (Rajan and Zin-
gales 2003; Gourinchas and Jeanne 2006). Some argue that the indirect (or “collateral”)
beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration might be even more important for growth and welfare than
direct beneﬁts (see Kose et al. 2006 for a recent survey).
The possibility of adopting a single currency, the euro, by more EU members has addi-
tional implications.4 The EU countries converting to the euro have to comply with some
stringent economic conditions (“the convergence criteria”) about the inﬂation rate, gov-
ernment spending and debt, and the stability of currency exchange rates. The inability of
individual members to use monetary policy to eliminate adverse shocks to their economies
(idiosyncratic, or country-speciﬁc, shocks) is an additional major concern for countries in a
monetary union. If idiosyncratic shocks are prevalent, a monetary union may lead to a loss
of welfare due to the lack of independent monetary policy, unless mechanisms for achieving
international income insurance and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) are in place.5 In
addition, with insurance against asymmetric output shocks people can specialize and safely
engage in riskier but high-return investment projects and guarantee higher expected con-
sumption growth and welfare, speed up capital accumulation and ﬁnancial deepening, and
reduce uncertainty in the growth process (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997; Obstfeld 1994b;
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha 2003; Imbs and Wacziarg 2003).
We compare potential welfare gains from integration resulting from international risk
sharing among the EU members and ignore other potential beneﬁts. Our analysis is based
4Currently twelve European Union countries have fully incorporated the euro as their national currency:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain. Among other EU members, Slovenia will adopt the euro on 1 January, 2007; Cyprus, Estonia,
Latvia, and Malta aim to adopt the euro on 1 January, 2008. Other EU members chose not to join or face
more distant dates for adoption.
5International risk sharing may materialize through central ﬁscal institutions and market institutions
(see Sorensen and Yosha 1998). Fiscal institutions (or a tax-transfer system) provide inter-country income
insurance by lowering taxes and increasing transfers to individuals and grants to governments of countries
that experience economic hardships. Market institutions include developed capital markets through which
the members of a union can share risk by smoothing their income via cross-ownership of productive assets
(portfolio diversiﬁcation). Alternatively, consumers may smooth their consumption (given their income) by
adjusting their savings rate; i.e., adjusting the size of their asset portfolio in response to shocks.
2on two scenarios. First, we follow Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) and estimate
“total” potential welfare gains countries obtain from moving from ﬁnancial autarky to full
risk sharing. The measure is estimated using the aggregate output (GDP per capita) data
under the assumption that in autarky a country consumes its own GDP and under full
risk sharing it consumes a portion of pooled group-wide GDP.6 Obviously none of the
economies we study are in ﬁnancial autarky; countries have already achieved some ﬁnancial
integration and synchronization of macroeconomic shocks within the group. We calculate
the actual extent of integration for each country to estimate how far countries stand from
full risk sharing (when all the country-speciﬁc shocks to consumption are eliminated). Our
criterion of integration is the degree of international income and consumption risk sharing
at the country level based on the method of Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996).7 Under
the second scenario, we calculate “unexploited” gains from risk sharing from moving from
consumption observed in the data to the perfect risk sharing consumption allocation. In
this case we estimate the measure of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) and a
measure proposed by van Wincoop (1994) using total per capita consumption data.
We ﬁnd a larger average gain for the new member-countries than for the original EU
members. The average total gain, in terms of permanent increase of consumption, is 5.2%
for New Members and 1.2% for EU-15 Members. The consumption-based measure of unex-
ploited welfare gains has the similar pattern: the gains are larger for the New Members (av-
erage of 6.6%) compared to the EU-15 Members group (average of 0.9%). In both cases the
larger value of the gain is primarily attributed to the output or consumption spending being
more volatile or sometimes negatively correlated with the EU-wide output or consumption.
If countries have already obtained a non-negligible amount of risk sharing, we would
expect that the total gains would be larger than the unexploited gains. We discovered,
however, that for most of the New Members, the consumption-based unexploited gains
6In other words, this measure quantiﬁes the potential loss of welfare due to asymmetric GDP ﬂuctuations
in the absence of risk sharing mechanisms. It is independent of the amount of risk sharing actually obtained.
7The measure reﬂects the sensitivity of national income (GNI per capita) or consumption (private and
government consumption) to idiosyncratic output (GDP per capita) ﬂuctuations. It potentially varies from 0
(no risk sharing as in autarky) to 100% (full risk sharing) and represents a percentage of insured idiosyncratic
risk to GDP (compared to perfect risk sharing).
3are strictly larger than GDP-based total gains. We speculate that the transition process
from planned to market economies and some taste shocks (broadly deﬁned) caused some
dis-smoothing of consumption in new EU members. It is also possible that the New Mem-
bers pursued other goals besides hedging their idiosyncratic output risk. For the EU-15
Members as a group, consumption-based estimates of unexploited welfare gains are smaller
than GDP-based total ones. These countries apparently attained some consumption insu-
rance compared to the autarky case. This does not, however, imply that EU-15 Mem-
bers will be worse oﬀ in case of enlargement. If EU-15 Members move towards full risk
sharing conditions, their potential welfare gains after enlargement would virtually be the
same as without it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic stylized
facts about the data. In Section 3 we evaluate the current extent of ﬁnancial integration
among the EU members based on the degree of international risk sharing at the country
level. Section 4 presents the welfare gain estimates. Section 5 concludes.
2 First Look at the Data
2.1 Data description
We work with yearly gross domestic product (GDP) and ﬁnal consumption expenditures
data on the country level and their corresponding aggregates for the twenty-ﬁve EU mem-
bers during the period 1994–2003. All the variables are converted into purchasing power
parity adjusted (PPP) US dollars using oﬃcial exchange rates between a domestic cur-
rency and US dollar in the year 1995, deﬂated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with
the base year 1995, and expressed in per capita terms.8 Growth rates of real per capita
variables are calculated as ﬁrst diﬀerences of natural log of real per capita level values. Lo-
8When using a utility based measure of ﬂuctuations asymmetry, output must be measured in
consumption-equivalent terms. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2001) recommend deﬂating by the
CPI rather than by a GDP-deﬂator. Since our measure is utility based, we want measured output to reﬂect
consumption in autarky (with countries consuming the value of their GDP). We want to translate GDP to
the amount of consumption that it can buy, therefore, we follow the above recommendation and deﬂate by
CPI.
4cal currency data for Gross Domestic Product and Final Consumption Expenditures come
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank (2006). Final
Consumption Expenditures consists of household ﬁnal consumption expenditure (formerly
private consumption) and general government ﬁnal consumption expenditure (formerly gen-
eral government consumption). For several New Members the consumption data are not
available for the initial several years of our sample period; we linearly extrapolated the
data to make up for the missing data points. Nominal Exchange Rate data between local
currency unit and US dollar in 1995 is taken from the Eurostat database. For calculating
per capita measures we use the WDI data for total population, which counts all residents
regardless of legal status or citizenship.
2.2 Output and consumption growth rates: Basic stylized facts
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for GDP and total consumption expenditures per
capita growth rates of individual countries for the period 1994-2003.9 The New Mem-
bers group consists of the developing economies with higher and more volatile growth rates
than those of the original EU-15 Members . This may have some important implications
for the stability of the enlarged Union. Overall, the growth rate for New Members is on
average 4.2% per annum versus 2.5% for EU-15 Members (median growth rates are 4.2%
and 2.1% correspondingly). The standard deviation of output growth is three times larger
for New Members than for EU-15 Members . Based on the t-test, the diﬀerences in means
and variances are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Both the rate of per capita
consumption growth and its variability are statistically and economically larger for New
Members countries than for EU-15 Members. The average growth rate for the ﬁrst group
is 4.3% versus 1.7% for the latter (median growth rates are 4.1% and 1.7%); the average
standard deviations are 5.0% and 1.6%. The more volatile a country’s output and con-
9We concentrate on the total consumption expenditures, which consists of private consumption and gov-
ernment expenditures, since potentially consumption risk sharing may be achieved through an international
tax-transfer system and saving as discussed in Sorensen and Yosha (1998) for example. Kose, Prasad and
Terrones (2003) show that total consumption of emerging markets and OECD countries is on average less
volatile than private consumption in the period 1960–1999, the evidence of additional smoothing achieved
by government taxes and transfers.
5sumption are, other things being equal, the larger the gain it receives from and provides to
other countries in the group. Judging from the volatility, New Members might have larger
beneﬁts from joining the Union than the original EU-15 Members.
In standard consumption theory people are risk-averse and therefore prefer to smooth
their consumption in the face of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in income or output. International
and domestic risk sharing should potentially result in smoother income and eventually
consumption relative to output. The ratio of the volatility of total consumption to that
of output can be considered a measure of the eﬃcacy of consumption smoothing, at the
national level, relative to output volatility. The last column of Table 1 reports the ratio
of the standard deviation of total consumption per capita growth to that of GDP per
capita growth. Despite some within-group exceptions, average volatility of consumption
is larger than that of output for New Members , but smaller for EU-15 Members ; the
ratio is equal to 1.3 for New Members and 0.9 for EU-15 Members. Prasad et al. (2003)
explains this ratio being larger than one as the lack of consumption risk sharing. The
caveat in this interpretation lies in the fact that the consumption data are often aﬀected
by taste shocks (broadly deﬁned to include inter alia ﬁscal or monetary policy, consumer
sentiment, etc.).10 If the taste shocks (and other noise in consumption) are large, they
might increase the volatility of consumption despite the possible non-negligible amount of
risk sharing. With this caveat in mind we observe that EU-15 Members have achieved
signiﬁcantly better consumption smoothing (relative to output) than New Members.11 At
the ﬁrst approximation, more integrated EU-15 Members have obtained some consumption
smoothing in line with Prasad et al. (2003). In contrast, for the new EU members the ratio
is greater than unity—evidence of potential room for further consumption insurance that
might be facilitated by economic integration.
10Stockman and Tesar (1995) show that taste shocks in consumption potentially explain the ﬁnding of
Backus, Kydland and Kehoe (1992) that, contrary to the theory, the international consumption correlations
are low. The low international consumption correlations is a manifestation of low ﬁnancial integration.
11t-statistics in the test that the variable Relative Volatility in Table 1 has the same mean within the two
groups is 1.97. We reject the null in favor of alternative that New Members has larger mean at 3%.
63 Extent of risk sharing
Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) come up with a measure of the actual amount of
risk sharing compared to full risk sharing at a country level. This is a more formal method
than the casual exploration of consumption and output volatilities. From the national
accounting identity gni=gdp+nfi if cross-border net factor income ﬂows (NFI) are counter-
cyclical they would partially insulate national income (GNI) from idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations
in national output (GDP). Further, total consumption may be stabilized relative to GNI
because pro-cyclical saving helps insulate consumption from shocks to national income by
virtue of the identity cons=gni–gross national saving.12
We estimate extent of income and consumption risk sharing as the coeﬃcient from the
individual country regressions g gdpit − e zit = νi + βg gdpit + εit, where g gdp is the growth
rate of per capita output measured at a country level by per capita GDP. When e zt stands
for the growth rate of per capita income measured by per capita GNI, β represents a
percentage of idiosyncratic risk to GDP insured through net factor income ﬂows (compared
to perfect risk sharing); denoted as b βi. When e zt stands for the growth rate of per capita
total consumption, β represents a percentage of idiosyncratic risk to GDP insured through
net factor income ﬂows, capital depreciation, government international grants and transfers,
and saving in credit markets; denoted b βc. Each variable with tilde (e . ) represents the growth
rate of the variable for an individual country i in time period t minus growth rate of the
variable for the empirical world in time period t (e.g, g gdpit = ∆loggdpit − ∆loggdpWorld
t ).
Intuitively income risk sharing βi shows the sensitivity of national income (GNI per capita)
to idiosyncratic output (GDP per capita) ﬂuctuations consumption risk sharing βc the
sensitivity of total (government and private) consumption per capita to idiosyncratic output
(GDP per capita) ﬂuctuations.13 With full income (consumption) risk sharing national
12Asdrubali et al. and Sorensen and Yosha (1998) determine several intermediate channels or risk sharing
which are not essential for our analysis. For example, if risk is not fully insured by cross-border net fac-
tor income ﬂows, further insurance may be achieved as the result of government international grants and
transfers; this is reﬂected as the diﬀerence between National Income and Disposable National Income.
13Obstfeld (1994a) tests for full consumption risk sharing by such time-series regression for individual
countries. Asdrubali et al. are the ﬁrst to estimate the average amount of consumption and income risk
sharing for a group of regions. They run the panel regression over the states of the United States.
7income (consumption) grows at the same rate across countries and are independent of
idiosyncratic shocks to national output, and b β = 100%.
Table 2 reports estimated income and consumption risk sharing in percentage points;
100% means full risk sharing. Income risk sharing gives insight on how a country is inte-
grated into international asset markets and how eﬀectively these markets are used to insure
national income (measured by Gross National Income per capita) against idiosyncratic
shocks to national output (GDP per capita). Notice that on average New Members seem
to obtain a larger degree of income risk sharing than EU-15 Members; the average extent of
income risk sharing is 26% for New Members and 9% for EU-15 Members (medians are 21%
and 7%). This does not mean that New Members are more open to capital ﬂows or have
deeper capital markets. Remember that the numbers in Table 2 report the extent of risk
sharing among the enlarged 25-member European Union and ignore additional insurance
with the rest of the world. Therefore, the evidence shows that New Members mostly share
risk within the EU whereas EU-15 Members may engage in risk sharing with the rest of the
world, including investing in America and Asia. Negative numbers (for Hungary, Slovakia
in New Members group and France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the U.K. among
EU-15 Members ) imply some dis-smoothing at corresponding level of risk sharing and can
also be due to risk sharing outside of the EU.14
In case of consumption risk sharing achieved at all levels of smoothing, EU-15 Mem-
bers (with the average of 47% and the median of 42%) are ahead of New Members (the
average 15%, the median 28%). This evidence implies that a lot of consumption smoothing
within the original European Union is achieved through international transfers (if the net
transfers to a country are larger during recessions), national government budget deﬁcits and
corporate (and possibly private) saving.15 The evidence shows that New Members did not
14Negative income risk sharing implies that idiosyncratic GNI responds more than one-to-one to idiosyn-
cratic GDP shocks—there is “dis-smoothing” of income relative to output. We are sympathetic to the view
of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2004) that the negative income risk sharing may be due to the ex-
cessive volatility of ﬁnancial returns. If foreign assets are purchased not hedging domestic output risk (such
as foreign direct investment) they do not provide returns that are negatively correlated with the output of
the home economy.
15Corporate saving aﬀects patterns of earnings retention: a larger share of proﬁts is distributed to share-
holders during recessions. Capital depreciation—typically counter-cyclical—brings the gap between National
8obtain as much total consumption risk sharing as the original EU members; with several
exceptions (Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden), the EU-15 Members members are still pretty
far from perfect risk sharing situation.16 Therefore, EU enlargement should produce welfare
gains for all the member-countries of the larger union.
4 Potential gains from international risk sharing
4.1 Total welfare gains from risk sharing
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) (henceforth, KSY) use standard assumptions—
symmetric information, no transaction costs, identical logarithmic utility u(ci
t) = log(ci
t)
and rate of time preference for all countries—and consider a group of N inﬁnite horizon
endowment economies inhabited by a representative risk averse individuals consuming a
homogeneous non-storable good. For each country i, they compare the expected utility
of consuming country’s own per capita endowment (gdpi
t) under autarky and consuming a
country-speciﬁc portion ki of the world endowment gdpt under perfect risk sharing. The
diﬀerence represents potential utility gains coming from a permanent increase in consump-
tion when an economy moves from full autarky to the prefect risk sharing within the group.
If countries achieve perfect risk sharing, the potential welfare gains are naturally zero.
With assumption of iid normally distributed growth rates, KSY derive closed form solu-
tions for the potential gains from risk sharing for identical logarithmic utility (expressed in
percent):17
GKSY













Income and Disposable National Income and may result in dis-smoothing. See Sorensen and Yosha (1998)
for details. They study income and consumption smoothing patterns among European Community dur-
ing the period 19661990. The European Community structural funds are an example of an international
tax-transfer system that may contribute to risk sharing, although Sorensen and Yosha emphasize that the
motivation for having a tax-transfer system may have nothing to do with risk sharing.
16We do not study the reasons for cross-country diﬀerences in the extent of risk sharing. See
Volosovych (2006) for the recent paper on this topic.
17KSY derive the utility gain measure for general CRRA utility u(c) = (1/1 − γ)c
1−γ (γ 6= 1) and show
that the empirical results are not very diﬀerent for general CRRA utility.
9where δ is the intertemporal discount rate; σ2 is the variance of the group-wide per capita
endowment growth rate; σ2
i is the variance of a country’s per capita endowment growth
rate; and covi is the covariance of a country’s endowment with the group-wide endowment.
The intuition for this formula is straightforward. First, the gain from sharing risk is higher
for countries with a lower covariance, covi, because countries with counter-cyclical output
provide insurance to other countries by stabilizing aggregate output and are compensated
in the risk sharing agreement. Second, the higher the variance of country i’s GDP, σ2
i ,
other things equal, the more it will beneﬁt from sharing risk with other countries. Third,
the higher the variance of the aggregate gross product of the group, keeping the variance of
country i’s GDP constant, the more other countries would be willing to “pay” a country i
for joining the risk sharing arrangement.
We estimate the expression (1) using the output data to directly match the theoretical
concept of “total” welfare gains as in the original KSY paper. The results, presented in the
ﬁrst column of Table 3, corroborate our assertion of between-group diﬀerences in potential
welfare gains. The total potential utility gains generated by moving from autarky consump-
tion to consuming a part of the overall group’s output (full risk sharing consumption) are
much larger for the New Members as the group in general, and for two Baltic countries
(Lithuania and Estonia), Malta, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovak Republic in particu-
lar.18 These are the countries that would gain the most from joining the European Union
and from the risk-sharing opportunities it oﬀers. The estimate of the gains for the other
New Members (Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovenia) are comparable to the values of
the original EU members. The gains for the EU-15 Members are much smaller.19 We ﬁnd
that EU-15 Members would still gain from risk sharing, especially Ireland, Luxembourg,
Finland, and Sweden.
18The estimate of average welfare gain for the ten New Members is equal to 5.2% versus 1.2 for the EU-15
Members.
19These ﬁndings are consistent with the results of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2004) and Sorensen
et al. (2006) who report a signiﬁcant decline in estimates of welfare gains for European countries in the late
1990s compared to the previous periods. For example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. calculate the same GDP-based
welfare gains measure as in this paper for 14 EU economies (excluding Luxembourg) and report its decline
from 1.2% in the 1983–1991 to 0.6% in the 1991–1999.
10An explanation for the discovered diﬀerences in potential welfare gains is beyond the
scope of this paper. We can try to reveal some forces driving the results by looking at the
components of the asymmetry measure (1). Columns two and three in Table 3 report the
variance of real per capita GDP growth, σ2
i , and its covariance with aggregate 25-country
EU GDP growth, covi. Consistent with the discussion of the summary statistics presented
earlier in this section, our ﬁndings show that the welfare gains for new member-countries are
primarily driven by a higher volatility of their GDP growth rates. Countries with the highest
values of asymmetry measure also have the largest variance of output growth; therefore,
they would contribute the most to the smoothing shocks in other countries. The two Baltic
countries (Estonia and Lithuania) have also a highly counter-cyclical output as measured
by the covariances covi. These economies should be “compensated” most in the risk sharing
agreement since they provide insurance to the rest of countries in the Union by stabilizing
aggregate output. The other members of the New Members group have either lower variance
or positive covariance of individual output growth with total output growth—the pattern
generally observed in the group of older EU members. Their covariances and variances are
generally smaller and have approximately the same order of magnitude. This explains the
lower potential gains from risk sharing for these countries. The exceptions are Finland,
Ireland and Luxembourg which have high GDP growth volatility.
The average gains for each of the two groups, both unweighted and population- or GDP-
weighted, mimic the general pattern of the in-group economies. The average gain for the
New Members (5.2%) is larger than that for the original EU-15 Members (1.2%). Table 3
shows that welfare gains are normally larger for the smaller economies. When we control
for the size of economies the average gain decreases for all countries, but the diﬀerence in
the gains between the original and new EU members still remains. On average, the total
potential beneﬁt for New Members is about four-ﬁve times higher than that for EU-15
Members. This does not, however, imply that EU-15 Members will be worse oﬀ in case of
enlargement. If EU-15 Members move toward full risk sharing conditions, their potential
11welfare gains after enlargement would virtually be the same as without it.20
4.2 Unexploited welfare gains from risk sharing
So far, we reported estimates of potential welfare gains that EU countries can obtain if they
move from theoretically asserted autarky consumption (which equals to each country’s per
capita GDP, gdpi
t) to full risk sharing consumption (which equals to a portion of the pooled
GDP, kigdpt). KSY note that their utility-based measure is general enough to evaluate the
unexploited welfare gains a representative consumer would achieve due to moving from the
actual consumption level ci
t (which is normally diﬀerent from the autarky consumption) to
the same ﬁnal point, i.e., the full risk sharing consumption level kigdpt. We estimate the
expression (1) using the actual consumption data. If countries have already made some
risk sharing eﬀorts toward full risk sharing, the unattained gains would be smaller than
those reported in Table 3. There is a caveat that makes such interpretation somewhat
problematic. The welfare gains measure calculated over the observed consumption data
may be subject to the inﬂuence of other factors aﬀecting the diversiﬁcation process. One
example is taste shocks to consumption pointed out by Stockman and Tesar (1995).
We report the estimated consumption-based KSY measure in Table 4. In general, the
pattern discovered in the measure based on GDP per capita growth is also observed in
the consumption-based measure: welfare gains are larger for the New Members (average of
6.6%) compared to the EU-15 Members group (average of 0.9%). The larger value of the
gain is primarily attributed to the large volatility of consumption spending. Lithuania and
Malta in the New Members group have also highly counter-cyclical consumption. An unex-
pected ﬁnding concerns the relative magnitude of total welfare gains in Table 3 compared
to the unexploited gains in Table 4. For the EU-15 Members as a group, the consumption-
based estimates of welfare gains are smaller than output-based reported in Table 3. These
countries apparently attained some consumption insurance compared to the autarky case.
20According to our calculations (not reported), the average potential welfare gains for EU-15 Members if
they were to remain in EU-15 is equal to 1.17%. In Table 3 we see that this number is almost equal to
welfare gains calculated for EU-15 in enlarged 25-country European Union (1.22%).
12In the case of New Members, the consumption-based estimates are strictly larger than
those based on GDP, with the exception of Lithuania and the Czech Republic. We speculate
that taste shocks and other factors do inﬂuence these results and make them hard to inter-
pret. Further research is needed to provide a deeper insight of the inﬂuence of taste shocks
on the gains from risk sharing. It is possible that the transition from planned to market
economies in central and eastern European countries actually caused some dis-smoothing
of consumption—possibly because the state provided a great deal of smoothing under the
previous system. It is also possible that these countries pursue other goals than hedging
their idiosyncratic output risk. The main ﬁnding of the previous section is still apparent:
if countries in the enlarged European Union move further toward ﬁnancial integration, the
gains to New Members would be large and to EU-15 Members be smaller, but non-nil.
4.3 Robustness
Table 5 reports the results of robustness checks. van Wincoop (1994) calculates the gains
from risk sharing in a setup similar to KSY (N endowment economies of equal size, rep-
resentative agents maximizing expected CRRA utility over the time horizon H, perfect
markets). van Wincoop concentrates on unexploited gains and compares the expected util-
ity of actual consumption ci
t to the utility of consuming the per capita world endowment
gdpt under perfect risk sharing.21 As in case of KSY, the measure of the welfare gain is the
utility equivalent of a permanent increase in expected level of consumption that produces
the same improvement in welfare as movement from current consumption to the prefect risk
sharing consumption (expressed in percent):
GW










21Note that van Wincoop assumes that all the economies have identical size, so a country-speciﬁc portions
k
i in the global endowment are the same for all countries (=1). This simpliﬁcation ignores the fact that
countries with negative output covariance with the rest of the group gets a larger share of aggregate output
reﬂecting a higher risk sharing value this country brings to the rest of the group (such country would have
a larger k
i, all else equal; see KSY for details). Naturally, the metric by van Wincoop would underestimate
the gains from risk sharing. We regard them as a lower bound of the true gains.
13where µi = µi−0.5γσ2
i is the risk-adjusted endowment growth rate; dσ2
i = σ2−σ2
i the change
in variance of endowment growth between the perfect risk sharing and current situation; ri
is the risk-free interest rate; σ2 is the variance of the group-wide per capita endowment; σ2
i
is the variance of a country’s per capita endowment; and γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion.
As a benchmark, we estimate the unexploited gains from risk sharing for the case of
log utility, similar to the KSY’s basic measure, and the other free parameters taken from
van Wincoop (1999).22 In column (1) of Table 5 r is a “theoretical” risk-free interest rate
as in van Wincoop (1994) estimated by the formula ˆ ri = δ − γµi, the the risk-adjusted
consumption growth rate µi is from the data, and time horizon corresponds to our time
period 1994–2003 (10 years).23 The average gains for New Members are about 0.7% and
less than 0.1% for EU-15 Members over the chosen short horizon of 10 years. The countries
with the largest gains are again Hungary, Lithuania, and Malta among New Members, and
Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden among EU-15 Members.
Alternative risk-free rate. In column (2) we follow van Wincoop (1999) and calculate
the real interest rate as the average diﬀerence between money market rates and consumer
price inﬂation over 1994–2003 obtaining similar but larger welfare gain estimates.24 Longer
time horizon. Observe that the estimates of unexploited gains by van Wincoop method are
smaller than by KSY method by an order of magnitude. The reason is the diﬀerent time
horizon. The longer the horizon, the larger the gains.25 In column (3) we use the same
22The estimates of welfare gains based on this metric depend on a larger number of parameters than in
case of KSY. The sensitivity analysis by van Wincoop (1999) shows that the welfare gains is larger the longer
the time horizon H; and also the larger the volatility of a country’s endowment σ
2
i ; the smaller the risk-free
rate r; and the larger the risk aversion coeﬃcient γ.
23We pick the intertemporal discount rate δ = 0.02 as in KSY. The risk-free rate estimated by this formula
is about 3–4% for New Members and about 9–10% for EU-15 Members.
24We use the data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics to calculate the real money market
interest rates. For each country and year we adjust the interest rate for the CPI inﬂation from the World
Bank (2006) and average the real interest rate for each country over the sample time period. Several EU-15
Members lack the data for the years 1999-2003, after adoption of the euro; missing values were substituted
with the eurozone rates. The risk-free rate estimated by this formula is smaller than in column (1): it is
about –5% for New Members and about 2% for EU-15 Members . Our ﬁnding of larger gains with lower
risk-free rate is qualitatively consistent with van Wincoop (1999).
25KSY measure assumes inﬁnite time horizon to attain the prefect risk sharing, whereas in van Wincoop
metric the horizon comes in as a parameter H.
14CRRA=1 and the risk-free rate from the data, but set the time horizon to 100 years. The
estimates of welfare gains closely match the numbers from column (1) in Table 4 based on
KSY method: average gains are about 5% for New Members and 1% for EU-15 Members.26
Larger risk-aversion coeﬃcient. In column (4) the parametrization of GW
i is similar to
column (2) but a “consensus” value of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ = 3 used by
van Wincoop (1999) and in a survey by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003). The estimated
gains are still lager than in column (1)–(2) but less than in column (3). The average gains
are about 2.3% for New Members and 0.3% for EU-15 Members over the horizon of 10
years.
Despite some diﬀerences in the value of welfare gain estimates, which depend on the
parametrization, the ranking of countries according to potential gains based on the van Wincoop (1994)
measure is consistent with the ranking from the Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001)
measure found in Section 4.2.27
5 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate potential welfare gains that European Union countries may obtain
if ﬁnancial integration between them deepens. In particular, we estimate the total potential
gains in expected utility if each of the EU-25 countries achieves full risk sharing (consuming
a portion of the Union’s GDP) compared to a ﬁnancial autarky situation (where each
country consumes only its own GDP). We also estimate the unexploited welfare gains, i.e.,
gains in each country’s expected utility if it moves from its actual per capita consumption
level (which is normally diﬀerent from the autarky consumption) to the same ﬁnal point,
i.e., a full risk sharing consumption level. For the estimation, we use measures developed
by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) and van Wincoop (1994).
26When CRRA=3 and the gains are even larger, about 25% for New Members and 2.3%. The results are
not reported.
27We also estimate the measure of van Wincoop (1994) based on GDP data following the original intuition
of KSY that such metric would show the total welfare gains from moving from ﬁnancial autarky to full risk
sharing. The results are similar to those in Section 4.2: gains for EU-15 Members are smaller than in
Table 5 (evidence of risk sharing) and larger for New Members (dis-smoothing of consumption). The results
are available.
15We compare gains for EU-15 countries and ten countries that joined the Union in 2004.
We ﬁnd that full and unexploited gains for the New Members are much larger than those
for the original EU-15 Members. Total potential welfare gains are especially large for the
two Baltic countries (Lithuania and Estonia), Malta, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic.
It is the higher volatility and sometimes the counter-cyclical pattern of their output that
creates large potential gains from risk sharing for the countries entering the European Union.
We ﬁnd that New Members and EU-15 Members also have some unexploited gains from
insuring their output risks in a larger Union; the beneﬁts for EU-15 Members are generally
smaller than those for New Members, however they are non-nil. The overall gains to all
25 members of the larger European Union are expected to be substantial if these countries
move to greater economic integration. The potential gains from risk sharing is an additional
beneﬁt that the future EU members should consider.28
We emphasize that the utility gains reported here are potential gains from moving from
consumption under autarky or current consumption to full risk sharing consumption. We
ﬁnd that the extent of risk sharing estimated by the method of Astrubali, Sorensen, and
Yosha (1996) is substantial for most of the countries of the larger European Union, but
well below full risk sharing when the idiosyncratic output shocks are completely diversiﬁed
(except for Luxembourg, Sweden, and Finland, who are very close). The further process of
integration within an enlarged European Union would most likely lead to further synchro-
nization of the consumption ﬂuctuations across member-countries with further depletion of
risk-sharing opportunities.29 At the moment, if economic integration continues and EU-25
economies successfully move toward full risk sharing conditions, we ﬁnd substantial welfare
gains for all members of the European Union.
28Among the closest new members, Bulgaria and Romania are oﬃcially joining the EU in January 2007.
The EU continues membership talks with Turkey and Croatia and is about to start the accession talks with
Serbia and other Balkan states.
29The fact that integration process itself aﬀects the degree of output asymmetry was emphasized by
Frankel and Rose (1998), Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001),
and Imbs (2004), among others. Increase in international risk sharing shall result in income and consumption
synchronization even though, as Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001 and 2003) demonstrate, economic
integration and better risk sharing may result in less correlated output growth because of larger specialization
in production. The net eﬀect on the business cycle of the EU member-countries is hard to predict.
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18Table 1: Summary statistics: GDP and Total Consumption per capita growth,
1994-2003
GDP Consumption Relative
Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Volatility
New Members
Cyprus 2.93 2.54 3.93 4.23 1.66
Czech Rep. 3.91 4.12 4.29 3.87 0.94
Estonia 5.82 4.59 5.44 2.93 0.64
Hungary 3.58 2.20 2.57 5.57 2.53
Latvia 5.73 2.46 7.11 3.10 1.26
Lithuania 4.49 8.49 3.80 8.22 0.97
Malta 2.11 5.99 2.86 7.14 1.19
Poland 5.11 4.31 5.97 4.91 1.14
Slovak Rep. 3.61 4.42 3.19 4.89 1.11
Slovenia 2.92 0.97 2.25 1.26 1.18
Average 4.20 4.32 4.34 4.97 1.26
Median 4.20 4.21 4.08 4.87 1.16
EU-15 Members
Austria 1.73 1.31 1.30 1.48 1.13
Belgium 1.73 1.23 1.83 0.66 0.53
Denmark 1.87 1.31 1.52 1.57 1.20
Finland 3.21 3.11 2.67 1.72 0.55
France 1.57 1.07 1.38 0.92 0.87
Germany 1.08 1.62 1.17 1.31 0.81
Greece 2.74 1.53 2.24 1.58 1.03
Ireland 6.52 4.82 4.38 3.47 0.72
Italy 1.38 1.62 1.58 1.65 1.02
Luxembourg 3.85 3.57 –3.24 0.78 0.22
Netherlands 1.66 2.08 1.69 1.62 0.78
Portugal 2.52 2.45 2.30 2.27 0.93
Spain 2.92 0.97 2.25 1.26 1.29
Sweden 2.11 3.51 1.58 3.03 0.86
UK 2.52 0.83 2.67 1.28 1.54
Average 2.49 2.07 1.69 1.64 0.90
Median 2.11 1.62 1.69 1.57 0.87
Average 25 3.18 2.97 2.75 2.97 1.04
Median 25 2.92 2.46 2.57 2.27 1.02
Notes: Relative Volatility is the ratio of the standard deviation of total consumption per capita growth to
that of GDP per capita growth. All numbers are multiplied by 100, except for Relative Volatility. Lines
Average 25 and Median 25 report statistics for all 25 countries.
19Table 2: Extent of Income and Consumption Risk Sharing within 25-Member
Union (% of Full Risk Sharing), 1994-2003
New Members EU-15 Members
Income Consum. Income Consum.
RS βi RS βc RS βi RS βc
Cyprus 16.34 12.18 Austria 56.47 1.05
Czech Rep. 36.44 28.95 Belgium 2.44 50.05
Estonia 28.99 62.98 Denmark 40.03 31.88
Hungary –20.85 –73.97 Finland 7.37 89.59
Latvia 22.54 50.07 France –12.67 66.50
Lithuania 13.47 7.80 Germany –13.74 15.86
Malta 69.26 –44.04 Greece 0.20 16.31
Poland 76.90 41.15 Ireland 19.09 46.71
Slovak Rep. –1.81 27.12 Italy 8.59 67.83






Average 26.12 15.17 Average 8.72 47.13
Median 21.22 28.04 Median 7.37 42.20
EU-25 Members
Income Consum.
RS βi RS βc
Average 15.68 34.35
Median 16.34 31.88
Notes: Table reports the estimates of risk sharing obtained by countries over the period 1994–2003 by the
method of Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996). The estimates evaluate the extent of risk sharing only
within the enlarged 25-member EU. Numbers reported in percent; 100% means full risk sharing. Extent of
risk sharing is calculated as the coeﬃcient from the individual country regressions g gdpit−e zit = νi+βg gdpit+
εit, where g gdp is the growth rate of per capita output measured at a country level by per capita GDP. When
e zt stands for the growth rate of per capita income measured by per capita GNI, β represents a percentage
of idiosyncratic risk to GDP insured through net factor income ﬂows (compared to perfect risk sharing);
denoted as β
i. When e zt stands for the growth rate of per capita total consumption, β represents a percentage
of idiosyncratic risk to GDP insured through net factor income ﬂows, capital depreciation, government
international grants and transfers, and saving (compared to perfect risk sharing); denoted β
c. Each variable
with tilde (e . ) represents the growth rate of the variable for an individual country i in time period t minus
growth rate of the variable for the “world” in time period t (e.g, g gdpit = ∆loggdpit − ∆loggdp
World
t ). The
“world” includes 25 members of the enlarged European Union.
20Table 3: Total Potential Welfare Gains from Risk Sharing for Individual New
Members and EU-15 Members (KSY), 1994-2003




Cyprus 1.20 6.45 1.08
Czech Republic 4.06 16.94 0.60
Estonia 5.98 21.09 –1.15
Hungary 1.62 4.83 –0.56
Latvia 1.97 6.07 –0.65
Lithuania 19.68 72.07 –3.07
Malta 8.47 35.84 1.24
Poland 3.90 18.59 1.75
Slovak Republic 4.88 19.53 0.27
Slovenia 0.31 0.95 0.11
Arithmetic Mean 5.21 – –
Weighted (pop)Average 2.96 – –
Weighted (gdp)Average 3.93 – –
EU-15 Members
Austria 0.27 1.75 0.57
Belgium 0.24 1.24 0.53
Denmark 0.28 2.06 0.55
Finland 2.02 5.87 1.05
France 0.27 0.57 0.28
Germany 0.47 1.47 0.63
Greece 0.91 3.24 –0.39
Ireland 4.99 10.26 1.89
Italy 0.60 1.98 0.37
Luxembourg 2.92 10.77 0.77
Netherlands 0.88 2.02 0.67
Portugal 1.13 4.15 1.01
Spain 0.31 0.62 0.11
Sweden 2.67 1.79 1.07
United Kingdom 0.27 0.50 0.07
Arithmetic Mean 1.22 – –
Weighted (pop)Average 0.57 – –
Weighted (gdp)Average 0.72 – –
Notes: First column is the welfare gains measure G
KSY, calculated over the period of 1994–2003 by


















2 is the variance of the aggregate EU-25 GDP growth
(10
4 ·σ
2 = 0.51[var(100·∆loggdp)]), and δ = 0.02. G
KSY is interpreted as total potential welfare gain that
a country would obtain from fully diversifying any country-speciﬁc variance in output expressed in terms of
the percent permanent increase in autarkic consumption (= to per capita GDP) that would result in the
same utility gain. Column 2 is 10
4·σ
2
i , and Column 3 is 10
4·cov
i. Column 4 is a correlation of each country’s
GDP growth with the total EU-25 GDP growth, i.e., corr
i = corr(∆loggdp
i,∆loggdp). Weighted averages
are population-weighted and GDP-weighted.
21Table 4: Unexploited Potential Welfare Gains from Risk Sharing for Individual
New Members and EU-15 Members (KSY), 1994–2003




Cyprus 4.79 17.87 –0.42
Czech Republic 3.82 14.96 0.07
Estonia 2.58 8.61 –0.63
Hungary 7.72 31.05 0.31
Latvia 2.86 9.63 –0.67
Lithuania 18.16 67.63 –2.27
Malta 13.37 50.94 –1.04
Poland 5.88 24.11 0.52
Slovak Republic 6.11 23.96 –0.02
Slovenia 0.37 1.58 0.28
Arithmetic Mean 6.57 – –
Weighted (pop)Average 4.22 – –
Weighted (gdp)Average 6.03 – –
EU-15 Members
Austria 0.37 2.20 0.60
Belgium 0.21 0.43 0.02
Denmark 0.67 2.46 0.12
Finland 1.06 2.97 –0.41
France 0.18 0.85 0.30
Germany 0.23 1.72 0.63
Greece 1.01 2.50 –0.54
Ireland 3.00 12.08 0.27
Italy 0.89 2.73 –0.19
Luxembourg 0.17 0.61 0.18
Netherlands 0.68 2.64 0.19
Portugal 1.20 5.16 0.40
Spain 0.37 1.58 0.28
Sweden 2.44 9.15 –0.07
United Kingdom 0.20 1.65 0.65
Arithmetic Mean 0.85 – –
Weighted (pop)Average 0.50 – –
Weighted (gdp)Average 0.50 – –
Notes: First column is the welfare gains measure G
KSY, calculated over the period of 1994–2003 by


















2 is the variance of the aggregate EU-25 total con-
sumption growth (10
4 · σ
2 = 0.46 [var(100 · ∆logcons)]), and δ = 0.02. G
KSY is interpreted as unexploited
potential welfare gain that a country would obtain from fully diversifying any country-speciﬁc variance in out-
put expressed in terms of the percent permanent increase in current consumption (observed in the data) that
would result in the same utility gain. Column 2 is 10
4·σ
2
i , and Column 3 is 10
4·cov
i. Column 4 is a correlation
of each country’s GDP growth with the total EU-25 GDP growth, i.e., corr
i = corr(∆logcons
i,∆logcons).
Weighted averages are population-weighted and GDP-weighted.
22Table 5: Robustness: Unexploited Potential Welfare Gains from Risk Sharing
for Individual New Members and EU-15 Members (van Wincoop), 1994–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRRA=1 CRRA=3
r = ˆ ri r = ¯ ri r = ¯ ri r = ¯ ri
H = 10 H = 10 H = 100 H = 10
New Members
Cyprus 0.46 0.50 5.62 1.48
Czech Republic 0.38 0.42 4.87 1.24
Estonia 0.22 0.24 3.02 0.71
Hungary 0.81 0.83 6.91 2.48
Latvia 0.24 0.28 3.71 0.83
Lithuania 1.78 2.49 31.95 7.41
Malta 1.34 1.40 13.88 4.17
Poland 0.63 0.70 9.01 2.08
Slovak Republic 0.62 0.66 6.91 1.97
Slovenia 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.09
Arithmetic Mean 0.65 0.75 8.61 2.25
Weighted (pop)Average 0.43 0.49 5.76 1.46
Weighted (gdp)Average 0.63 0.69 8.01 2.07
EU-15 Members
Austria 0.05 0.05 0.39 0.14
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.05 0.05 0.46 0.16
Finland 0.07 0.07 0.59 0.21
France 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.03
Germany 0.03 0.05 0.60 0.14
Greece 0.05 0.06 0.53 0.17
Ireland 0.31 0.33 3.94 1.00
Italy 0.06 0.06 0.53 0.19
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Netherlands 0.06 0.06 0.43 0.18
Portugal 0.13 0.13 1.42 0.40
Spain 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.09
Sweden 0.23 0.29 4.00 0.88
United Kingdom 0.03 0.05 0.58 0.16
Arithmetic Mean 0.07 0.08 0.92 0.25
Weighted (pop)Average 0.05 0.05 0.57 0.16
Weighted (gdp)Average 0.06 0.07 0.87 0.22
Notes: Table reports the welfare gains measure G
W, calculated over the period of 1994–2003 by the method









. Here γ is coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion; µi = µi −0.5γσ
2







variance of the group-wide per capita consumption, σ
2
i the variance of a country’s per capita consumption;
H is the length of time horizon. In column (1) γ = 1, the risk-free interest rate r is calculated by formula
ˆ ri = δ − γµi and δ is the intertemporal discount rate is chosen to be 0.02, in column (2) ¯ ri is the real
interest rate calculated as the diﬀerence between money market rates (from the IMF IFS) and consumer
price inﬂation (from the World Bank), average over 1994–2003; H is equal to 10 years corresponding to
1994–2003. In column (3) H is equal to 100 years. Parametrization in column (4) is similar to column (2)
but γ = 3. Weighted averages are population-weighted and GDP-weighted.